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EVIDENCE II: EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
AS PROOF OF INTENT
LEE E. TEITELBAUM* and NANCY AUGUSTUS HERTZ**

Few issues trouble courts as sorely and often as does the admissibility
of prior crimes evidence. State v. Carr,' decided during the Survey year
by the New Mexico Court of Appeals, illustrates both the difficulty such
cases produce and the reasons for the difficulty. Carr involved a common
enough situation. The prosecution introduced evidence of other crimes
to show the defendant's intent to commit the crime for which he was on
trial. The court of appeals came to the same result most courts would
reach; namely, that the evidence was introducible to show intent. The
relevance of the evidence in this case, however, and in many other cases
reaching a like result, seems to depend upon an inference about the
defendant's propensity for crime, which is ordinarily thought to be a
prohibited use of such evidence. This article will review the problems
raised in Carr in order to show that determining whether evidence of
other crimes or wrongs should be admitted requires the most painstaking
analysis of the relevance of that evidence.
Evidence of wrongs other than the crime charged may be relevant for
a number of purposes. In some cases, the evidence may support only an
inference that the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait on
a particular occasion. Rules 404(a) and 4052 specifically exclude this use
of evidence of other wrongs. The former Rule makes inadmissible, with
certain exceptions, evidence relevant on the following theory: Defendant
committed a wrong in the past; defendant therefore has a propensity or
a character trait for committing wrongful acts; therefore defendant is more
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico; A.B., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., Northwestern University.
**Notes and Comments Editor, New Mexico Law Review, 1982-83.
1. 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186, cert.
denied, -

U.S. -,

102 S.Ct. 298 (1981).

2. N.M. R. Evid. 404(a)provides: "Characterevidence generally. Evidenceofa person's character
or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion .
N.M. R. Evid. 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross examination, inquiry is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct. (b) Specific instances of conduct. In
cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element
of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of his
conduct.
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likely to have engaged in the act for which he is on trial than is someone
not known to have this character trait. 3 Rule 405 provides that even when
a character trait is admissible circumstantial evidence, it may be established only by proof of reputation or opinion and not by proof of specific
acts.
These rules exclude evidence of other wrongs to prove character as a
matter of policy, not because it is irrelevant. 4 Use of character evidence
creates two related dangers. First, the jury may conclude that the defendant is such an odious person that he ought to be punished regardless
of the merits of the particular case before the court. 5 Second, the jury
may rely too heavily on a weak inference of conforming behavior in
reaching its verdict. 6 Accordingly, Rule 404 specifically prohibits the
introduction of character evidence to prove that the defendant acted in
conformity with his character on a particular occasion, unless the accused
first injects his character into the case.
In other instances, however, the inference drawn from evidence of
other wrongs does not relate to the defendant's character. A prior crime
may supply the defendant's motive for committing the charged crime,
may show the defendant's preparation for this crime, or may demonstrate
that the defendant's act was not merely an accident or a mistake. When
used for these purposes, evidence of previous crimes or wrong acts would
be admissible, subject only to the balancing of probative value against
prejudicial effect required by Rule 403, 7 because the relevance of the
evidence does not depend upon an inference about the defendant's character.
The most common permissible uses of evidence of other wrongs are
3. Although evidence of character would be relevant to the issue of whether the defendant
committed the charged crime, it is unlikely to be sufficient by itself, even if it were admissible, to
support a conviction. For a thorough discussion of the inferential process as applied to circumstantial
evidence, see J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadboum, & J. Mansfield, Evidence Cases and Materials
867-69 (6th ed. 1973).
4. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948).
5. "Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial ....
It subtly
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective
characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened." Advisory Committee
Note, Rule 404, reprinted in S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 133
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Saltzburg & Redden]. 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence
§ 136 (1979 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Louisell & Mueller], collect the cases illustrating
this point in the margin notes.
6. Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 5, at 133.
7. N.M. R. Evid. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
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set forth in Rule 404(b).8 Most of them cause no character evidence
problems because the inferences to be drawn are plainly not dependent
upon the defendant's propensity to act in a certain way. For example, if
the defendant is on trial for the murder of two FBI agents, evidence that
the defendant had jumped bond while charged with attempted murder on
a past occasion is not admissible to show that the defendant has a propensity to commit murder and that he therefore probably committed this
murder. The evidence is admissible, however, to show that the defendant
had a motive for reacting with deadly force when followed by the FBI
agents and that he therefore probably did so. 9 The only inference that
need be drawn to establish the relevance of the evidence is that a person
with a motive to commit a particular crime is more likely to commit that
crime than is a person about whom nothing is known. This inference can
be drawn even if the defendant is a person of generally peaceful character.
In general, cases and commentators assume that when other crimes
evidence is genuinely relevant on intent, its use will not offend the rule
against character evidence. Rules 404(a) and 404(b) are understood as
mutually exclusive categories; because proof of other crimes to prove
intent is permitted under 404(b), it cannot be forbidden by 404(a). However, intent has more than one meaning and different meanings of intent
require different analyses of relevance. When intent refers to the defendant's knowledge or plan, or when it establishes absence of mistake,
evidence relevant to intent does not involve an inference about the defendant's character and is therefore admissible. Wigmore offers this example:
Thus, if A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun
8. N.M. R. Evid. 404(b) provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
Prior offense evidence is admissible for reasons so numerous that one commentator has suggested
redrafting Rule 404 to read:
Prior offense evidence may be received in criminal cases on any issue as to which
it may be relevant, unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk
of unfair prejudice, except that it may not be received if its only relevance is to
show a propensity on the part of the accused.
2 Louisell & Mueller, supra note 5, § 140, at 114. Another writer would eliminate the term "character
evidence" and draft a rule requiring only that all evidence of specific instances of conduct be subject
to the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect. Under this rule, the absolute prohibition
against character evidence used to show that a person acted in accordance with some known propensity
would disappear. Kuhns, The PropensitY to Misunderstand the Characterof Specific Acts Evidence,
66 Iowa L. Rev. 777 (1981).
9. United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 320-21 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979).
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whistling past his head, he is willing to accept B's bad aim or B's
accidental tripping as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly afterwards the same thing happens again, and if on the third occasion
A receives B's bullet in his body, the immediate inference (i.e., as
a probability, perhaps not a certainty) is that B shot at A deliberately;
because the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three successive
similar occasions are extremely small; or (to put it in another way)
because inadvertence or accident is only an abnormal or occasional
explanation for the discharge of a gun at a given object, and therefore
the recurrence of a similar result (i.e., discharge towards the same
object, A) excludes the fair possibility of such an abnormal cause
and points out the cause as probably a more natural and usual one,
i.e., a deliberate discharge at A. In short, similar results do not
usually occur through abnormal causes; and the recurrence of a similar result (here in the shape of an unlawful act) tends (increasingly
with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or selfdefense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to
establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence
of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act; and
the force of each additional instance will vary in each kind of offense
according to the probability that the act could be repeated, within a
limited time and under given circumstances, with an innocent intent. 0
The inference that B deliberately shot at A can be drawn without any
reference to B's character; it derives rather from the low probability that
this series of events occurred accidentally.
Evidence of other similar wrongs is relevant to show knowledge when
the defendant contends that he was unaware that his behavior was criminal, because it is unlikely "that repeated instances of behavior, even if
originally innocent, will not have resulted in defendant's having the requisite state of knowledge by the time of the charged crime." " Where the
charged crime is the manufacture and possession for sale of PCP ("angel
dust"), and where the defendant claims to be an innocent bystander
unfamiliar with PCP and therefore ignorant that it was being manufactured
on her patio, evidence that during the three months immediately preceding
the charged offense she had twice been present or in control of premises
used for the manufacture of the chemical is admissible to rebut her claim
of ignorance.' 2 The inference that a person repeatedly found in certain
circumstances probably knows what is going on there can be made without
an inference about the person's character. For example, it is not necessary
in the case just described to infer that the defendant is a drug abuser or
10. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 302, at 241 (1979).
11. 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 404[13], at 404-73 (1981).
12. People v. Goodall, 131 Cal. App. 3d 107, 182 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1982).
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a drug seller to reach the conclusion that she knew that the substance
produced on her patio was PCP.'3
In other cases, however, it is impossible to distinguish between evidence offered to prove intent and its use as character evidence. A good
example of the tenuousness of the distinction between inadmissible propensity evidence and admissible evidence of intent is State v. Carr. 14 This
case reveals that evidence of intent based on prior bad acts is sometimes
relevant to the charged crime only through an inference about the defendant's character. The resulting problem is whether a court should
exclude such evidence under Rule 404(a) or admit the evidence under
Rule 404(b).
Gerson Carr, a physician, was convicted of 42 counts of drug traffick16
ing. 5 He was prosecuted under the Controlled Substances Act, which
makes it illegal for a physician intentionally to distribute a controlled
substance "not in the course of his professional medical practice." 7 The
indictment charged Dr. Carr with trafficking inthat "he gave Niki Jones,
not in the course of his professional medical practice or research, a bottle
13. The court properly admitted the evidence of prior wrongs in this case to refute the defendant's
testimony that, "[sihe would not recognize PCP if she saw it, she had never seen it being manufactured
182
before, and she had only once been in the presence of a person who smoked it." Id. at -,
Cal. Rptr. at 248. This evidence by itself is not conclusive on the issue of guilt of the charged
crimes. It is, however, relevant to the element of intent to manufacture PCP thorugh a two-step
analysis. The first inference relates to the defendant's knowledge that the substance being manufactured was PCP. PCP has a strong and characteristic odor. It is therefore likely that a person who
was present on one occasion when PCP was being manufactured knows that the substance being
manufactured on a subsequent occasion is also PCP. Once it is inferred that the defendant recognizes
PCP, a second inference-that she intended that PCP be manufactured-arises, because it is likely
that a person who knew the end result of a particular action probably intended that result when the
action was undertaken.
14. 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186, cert.
U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 298 (1981).
denied, 15. 95 N.M. at 758, 626 P.2d at 295.
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-31-1 to -40 (Repl. Pamp. 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
17. 95 N.M. at 762, 626 P.2d at 299. Some interpretation is necessary to reach the conclusion
that a physician can be prosecuted under the Controlled Substances Act. Section 30-31-20 prohibits
and defines trafficking: "A. As used in the Controlled Substance Act, 'traffic' means the: . . .
2. distribution, sale, barter or giving away any controlled substance. . . . B. Except as authorized
" Section
by the Controlled Substances Act, it is unlawful for any person to intentionally traffic ..
30-31-2(J) defines distribute: " '[D]istribute' means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance." Dr. Carr contended that a physician who prescribes a drug cannot
be prosecuted under either of these sections, but the court held that "a physician is prescribing drugs
only when he issues a prescription for a legitimate medical purpose and when acting in the usual
course of his professional practice." 95 N.M. at 762, 626 P.2d at 299. The issue therefore became
whether Dr. Carr intended to prescribe the drugs in question for a legitimate medical reason or
whether he intended to prescribe drugs for a non-medical, and therefore criminal, purpose. A
substantial portion of the opinion deals with the correctness of the application of the trafficking and
dispensing statutes to a licensed physician, but this statutory and constitutional issue is not within
the scope of an evidence survey article. For a discussion of Carr from this aspect, see Hollander,
Criminal Law, ante at 323.
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of pills which was a Schedule II narcotic drug."' 8 Niki Jones was the
state's principal witness at trial; Dr. Carr did not testify.19
The evidence presented at trial was voluminous; the trial lasted three
weeks and the transcript fills both sides of thirty-five tapes. 2' Numerous
evidentiary issues were raised on appeal, the most difficult of which
concerned the admissibility of evidence of Dr. Carr's involvement with
two women patients, Mary Gennari and Martha Hamilton. The prosecution characterized this testimony as evidence of uncharged crimes relevant to the material element of intent, and therefore admissible under
Rule 404(b). 2' The defense contended that the testimony was irrelevant
and therefore inadmissible under Rule 402, and that even if relevant, it
was so highly prejudicial as to require exclusion under Rule 403.22
The disputed evidence concerning Mary and Martha was essentially
the same. Witnesses who had been present during transactions between
Dr. Carr and the two women testified that Dr. Carr administered drugs
to Mary and Martha in exchange for sexual favors. 23 Although Dr. Carr
had not been indicted for these offenses, the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce this testimony on the theory that it tended to establish
Dr. Carr's intent to prescribe drugs for Niki Jones not in the course of
medical treatment.
As defined by one of the applicable regulations, 24 the requisite criminal
intent- depended on whether Dr. Carr prescribed a controlled substance
for Niki Jones for reasons other than a "legitimate medical purpose. '25
Accordingly, the prosecution argued that evidence that Dr. Carr prescribed
drugs for Mary and Martha in exchange for sexual favors led to the
inference that he also provided controlled substances for Niki Jones for
a similar non-medical purpose-in this case, for a share of the money
she would receive for selling the drugs on the street.
The court of appeals accepted this rationale and held that the evidence
of other wrongs was admissible, stating, "[t]his evidence all related to
the circumstances under which the defendant prescribed drugs to Gennari
18. 95 N.M. at 762, 626 P.2d at 299.
19. Telephone conversation with Ann Steinmetz, Esq., defense attorney (July 15, 1982).
20. Motion for Leave to Exceed the Length of the Brief, at 1, filed June 12, 1980, by attorney
Steven G. Farber, Esq., State v. Carr (a partial record is on file at the University of New Mexico
Law Library).
21. Plaintiff-Appellee's Response Brief at 32, State v. Carr.
22. 95 N.M. at 766-67, 626 P.2d at 303-304.
23. Plaintiff-Appellee's Response Brief at 37-38, State v. Carr; 95 N.M. at 771, 626 P.2d at
308.
24. New Mexico Drug Laws and Bd. of Pharmacy Regulations, no. 20, §913(A) (1980), reads
in pertinent part: "A prescription for a controlled substance may be issued only for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.
25. Id.

Spring 1983]

EVIDENCE //

and Hamilton, and the jury was instructed to consider the evidence only
in determining defendant's intent to act outside the course of his professional practice. The testimony was clearly relevant for that purpose."26
The court of appeals failed to consider, however, that the kind of inference
necessary to link evidence of Dr. Carr's intent regarding Mary and Martha
with his intent regarding Niki Jones is indistinguishable from inadmissible
propensity evidence. Dr. Carr's intent to administer drugs to Mary and
Martha outside the scope of his professional medical practice is relevant
to the doctor's intent to act similarly toward Niki Jones solely on the
assumption that the transactions with Mary and Martha show that Dr.
Carr is the kind of person who harbors the intent to dispense drugs for
non-medical purposes. 27 That is, the evidence is relevant to intent only
through an inference as to the doctor's propensity to prescribe drugs for
non-medical purposes.
The court of appeals ended its analysis of the admissibility of the
evidence of Dr. Carr's prior conduct by holding that evidence relevant
to the issue of intent. Although it is accurate so to characterize the evidence, it is also true that in this case the other wrongs prove intent only
through an inference of character or propensity of exactly the kind that
is prohibited when such evidence is offered to show conforming behavior.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals is not the only court to have reached
this result without noticing that relevance may depend entirely on some
inferred propensity for crime. The Fifth Circuit, for example, faced with
this issue, reached the same conclusion in what is something of a leading
case, United States v. Beechum.28 A federal letter carier was convicted
of unlawful possession of a silver dollar that he knew to be stolen from
the mails. In fact, postal inspectors who suspected the carrier of rifling
the mail had planted the coin in a mailbox on the carrier's route. 29 The
primary issue in the case was whether the carrier intended to keep the
coin unlawfully or whether, as he claimed, he intended to turn the coin
over to his superiors at the post office. 3" To establish the requisite criminal
intent, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce into evidence two
unsigned credit cards that had been found in the carrier's possession. The
cards had not been issued to the carrier and had been mailed some months
26. 95 N.M. at 767, 626 P.2d at 304.
"
'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
27.
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." N.M. R. Evid. 401. Without an inference that one who has
committed a past act is likely to repeat it, there would be no nexus, and thus no relevance, between
the past and the present act.
28. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
29. 582 F.2d at 903.
30. Id. at 905.
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previously to addresses on routes that he had worked. 3 In upholding the
introduction of this evidence, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, stated:
If Beechum [the letter carrier] wrongfully possessed these cards, the
plausibility of his story about the coin is appreciably diminished.
Therefore, assuming that it could be established that the cards were
wrongfully possessed by Beechum, they were relevant to the issue2
of Beechum's intent to commit the crime for which he was charged.3

The court further explained how the cards were relevant to the charge of
intent to possess the coin:
Where the issue addressed is the defendant's intent to commit the
offense charged, the relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from
the defendant's indulging himself in the same state of mind in the
perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning
is that because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic
offense, 33it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present
offense.

In the italicized sentence above, the court omitted a critical step in
the analysis. Evidence of unlawful intent in a prior offense is relevant to
unlawful intent in the present offense only on the assumption that people
are likely to repeat past behavior because of a character trait or a propensity to act in a certain way. 34 The Beechum court did suggest that
the touchstone of the trial judge's analysis in this context should be
whether the Government has proved the extrinsic offense sufficiently
to allow the jury to determine that the defendant possessed the same
state of mind at the time he committed the extrinsic offense35as he

allegedly possessed when he committed the charged offense.
There is no reason to think, however, that the "state of mind" of the
defendant was a continuing mental condition. Apparently, therefore, the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the present offense was proved
by showing a state of mind on a previous occasion and positing that such
a state of mind probably continued over time and across separate transactions. A state of mind that continues over time and governs otherwise
unconnected acts is generally called a person's character trait or propensity. It is difficult to understand how the evidence of other wrongs in
Beechum and Carr was relevant on any theory other than to show that
the two defendants acted in conformity with their characters, as demonstrated by the prior crimes, when they committed the crimes for which
31,
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 904.
Id. at 907.
Id. at 911 (emphasis added).
See supra note 27.
582 F.2d at 914 (emphasis added).
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they were indicted. This use of character evidence seemingly is just what
Rule 404 specifically prohibits.
It might, perhaps, be argued in defense of Beechum and Carr that Rule
404(a) only prohibits evidence of a character trait when offered to prove
that a person "acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion"
and thus only limits character evidence offered to prove that a defendant
committed the actus reus. Because the evidence in Carr and Beechum
was offered to establish a state of mind rather than conduct, its introduction
would not offend Rule 404(a). This reading of the character evidence
rule might even seem to reflect the relative difficulty of proving a subjective mental element and would assure the mutual exclusivity of Rules
404(a) and 404(b).
Several flaws in this interpretation come readily to mind. The first is
that, even if Rule 404(a) prohibits character evidence only when offered
to prove the actus reus, Rule 405 prohibits use of specific acts to prove
character except when a character trait is itself an element of some claim
or defense. Plainly, character is not an element in any of the cases we
have considered and, therefore, only reputation or opinion evidence would
have been admissible to establish the propensity from which criminal
intent was inferred.
A second answer to the actus reus interpretation is that such a reading
is strained and improbable. Simply as a matter of language, to act in
conformity with a character trait seems to reach intent as well as conduct.
To say that a person has a propensity for theft does not mean merely that
he or she has an inclination to take things but to take things with the
intent to keep them. To say that another person has a propensity or
character for lying does not simply imply that he or she says things that
are false but that he or she knows they are false and intends to mislead
others by their utterance. Indeed, most character traits about which we
are concerned include some mental element that is essential to their
definition.
Finally, an actus reus interpretation of Rule 404(a) would practically
emasculate the Rule itself. One instance could stand for many. Suppose
that a defendant is charged with robbing a convenience store. There is
evidence that, on two previous occasions, the defendant has robbed other
stores (although not in any distinctive fashion). Under an actus reus
reading of Rule 404(a) or, for that matter, under the Beechum court's
analysis of state of mind, the prosecution could offer the prior crimes not
to prove that the defendant took the victim's money but to establish that
the defendant intended to keep the money rather than return it the next
day. Only the general balancing requirement of Rule 403 might justify
exclusion of the evidence. Because intent to keep property taken from
another is an element of all theft offenses, which the prosecution is both

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

required and entitled to prove, the actus reus theory would routinely
allow evidence of other thefts by the accused regardless of any particular
resemblance to the crime charged. 3 6 This reading of Rule 404(b) would
so fundamentally weaken the traditional prohibition of prior crimes evidence as to be inconsistent with the policy bases of Rule 404(a).
One more difficulty with the Carr decision bears mention. Even when
a court has determined that evidence of other wrongs is relevant to an
issue such as intent or knowledge, that determination does not automatically mean that the evidence is admissible. Relevant evidence may be
excluded for a variety of practical and policy considerations.3 7 Dr. Carr
advanced the chief reason for exclusion-that the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 38
Rule 403 does not articulate a uniform balancing procedure, but the
following factors should be taken into consideration: 1) need for the
evidence, 2) strength of the other crimes evidence, 3) persuasiveness or
probative worth of the other crimes evidence, and 4) degree of risk of
prejudice to the defendant. 39 In Carr, the court concluded that the evidence
was necessary because "intent must usually be proved circumstantially." 4 o
The court did not address the strength of the proof of the other crimes.
Where the prior crime has not resulted in a conviction, courts usually
require that proof of its commission be "clear and convincing." 4 In this
case, the evidence was in the form of testimony from friends and relatives42
of Mary and Martha, both of whom were dead by the time of the trial.
If the testifying witnesses believed that Mary and Martha had died as the
result of a drug addiction fostered by Dr. Carr, the testimony may not
have risen to the level of clear and convincing evidence because the
witnesses could be expected to be biased.
Moreover, there is considerable ground for concern that the evidence
36. The same results could occur in a variety of non-theft crimes as well. For example, the
prosecution might offer evidence of prior unrelated assaults or murders by the defendant on the
theory that they proved, not that defendant committed the attack for which he is now on trial, but
that the injury was intentionally inflicted. The inference is, of course, that defendant has a propensity
for injuring others and, therefore, intended to inflict this injury. This interpretation does not seem
different from the inferences in Carrand Beechum; if the interpretations are not different, the evidence
would be admissible subject only to Rule 403.
37. N.M. R. Evid. 403, supra note 7.
38. 95 N.M. at 767, 626 P.2d at 304.
39. 2 Louisell & Mueller, supra note 5, § 140, at 116-122.
40. 95 N.M. at 767, 626 P.2d at 304. See also R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modem Approach
to Evidence, 225-26 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Lempert & Saltzburg], on necessity as a
specific reason for receiving other crimes evidence on the issue of intent.
41. 2 Louisell & Mueller, supra note 5, § 140, at 118. For a discussion of the effect of Fed. R.
Evid. 404 on the proof necessary for introduction of prior crimes evidence, see Lempert & Saltzburg,
supra note 40, at 221-24, and the majority and dissenting opinions in United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
42. Telephone conversation with Ann Steinmetz, Esq., defense attorney (July 15, 1982).
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about Dr. Carr's personal involvement with Mary and Martha was highly
prejudicial in the context of this trial. Because the risk of prejudice cannot
be quantified, it will never be possible to state with accuracy when this
risk outweighs probative value, although one court has stated that evidence should be excluded "where the minute peg of relevancy [is] entirely
obscured by the dirty linen hung upon it." '1 3 Dr. Carr's trial lasted for
three weeks, more than two weeks of which was devoted to testimony
about his relationships with Mary and Martha. Niki Jones, the only witness to give direct testimony about the crimes charged in the indictment,
testified only on the first and second days of the trial. If the effect of the
prolonged testimony of other wrongs obscured the jury's view of the
charged crimes and incited them to convict Dr. Carr because he was
portrayed as "a sex maniac and drug dealer," 44 then the prejudicial effect
of the evidence would have outweighed its probative value. "Where most
of trial time is spent on collateral matters rather than on the matters
covered by the indictment, the emphasis at trial becomes
distorted, re45
sulting in unfair prejudice and misleading the jury."
Reversal on the ground of unfair prejudice is, however, difficult to
achieve. The issue before the appellate court is only whether the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence.46 Because the court
of appeals found the testimony to be both proper and necessary, it held
that there had been no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The frequency
of such rulings makes apparent the importance of accurately analyzing
other crimes evidence at the outset.

43.
44.
45.
46.

State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 379, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (1950).
95 N.M. at 772, 626 P.2d at 309 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
id.
95 N.M. at 767, 626 P.2d at 304.

